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Individual retirement accounts (IR.4s) are examples of long term, low tax savings
vehicles with fairly substantial penalties for early withdrawals. This paper shows that the
introduction of illiquid retirement savings such as IRAs can improve welfare. The
illiquidity of IRAs may force people to oversave in mid-life if the withdrawa] restriction
is binding. Small oversaving of this kind is desirable, as it has a first order positive effect
on tax revenues but only a second order negative effect on welfare. An off-setting
negative implication of illiquid retirement accounts is that they lower the tax on the
inframarginal savings people are willing to put in an illiquid retirement account even if
such an account is not tax-favored. Hence, the introduction of illiquid retirement savings
may have to be accompanied by an increase in the tax on ordinary savings to maintain
equa] expected tax revenues. This tax increase has a negative first order impact on
welfare. Generally, however, illiquid savings accounts such as [RAs improve welfare.
This paper has benefited form comments by Lans Bovenberg, Hugo Keuzenkamp and Kazl
Scholz.I
1. Introduction
The tax systems of many countries consíst of a set of tax rates as well as of
severa] quantitative restrictions. As an example of the latter, early withdrawals from tax-
favored retirement savings accounts, such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in
the United States, are generally restricted. This paper demonstrates that the introduction
of illiquid retirement savings alongside an ordinary savings channel can be welfare
improving.
The U.S. provides for tax-favored retirement saving in the form of employer-
sponsored pension plans, Keogh accounts for self-employed individuals, as well as IRAs.
Contributions to such accounts to some extent are tax deductible, and interest earnings
accrue tax free. Early withdrawals, however, may be impossible in the case of some
private pension plans, and they are substantially penalized in the case of IRAs. The
penalty for early withdrawals from IRAs (before the age of 59.5 years) is currently 10
per cent and this penalty is in addition to the income tax liability incurred for any
withdrawal. IRAs were made available to all employees by the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, but tax-free contributions were reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
IRA contributions are at present not tax deductible at all for couples benefiting from
employer-sponsored pension plans with annual incomes in excess of 550,000 and for
singles with incomes above 535,000.' Retirement saving in tax-favored accounts,
however, remains an important source of personal saving.
From an individual saver's perspective, ordinary and retirement savings are not
perfect substitutes as they differ in their tax treatments and as IRA savings are less liquid
than ordinary savings. Several empirical researchers have investigated what saver
characteristics inFluence individual IRA contributions (see, for instance, Collins and
Wykoff [1987], and O'IVeil and Thompson (1987]), and whether IRAs in fact provide for
net new savings (see Hubbard [1984], Venti and Weiss [1986, 1987, 1990], Feenberg and
Skinner [1989], and Gale and Scholz [1990]). Hubbard [1984], Venti and Weiss [1986,
1987, 1990], and Feenberg and Skinner [1989] provide evidence supporting the view that
IRA savings to a large extent indeed are additional savings. Carroll and Summers [1987]
further report that the Canadian savings rate rose in the 1970's relative to the U.S. rate2
after Canada extended its tax-favored savings plan.' Recent work by Gale and Scholz
[1990], however, argues that only a small proportion of IRA savings represents a net
addition to savings, which suggests IRA and other savings are rather close substitutes.
W'hile it is important to know how individuals respond to IRAs, it remains to be
resolved whether offering lRAs can ever be desirable in the first place. In a world of
certainty, IRAs are hard to rationalize. With complete certainty, there can never be any
unforeseen costs to the saver stemming from the illiquidity of IRAs. Hence, the main
difference between ordinary and IRA savings is their separate tax treatments. IRAs
specifically lower the marginal and also the inframarginal tax on long term savings. The
latter appears undesirable, and the former can be attained equally well by a unified tax
treatment of all savings.
In a world of uncertainty, the illiquidity of IRAs can give rise to unexpected costs
to the saver. It is, for example, possible that previous IRA contributions accrue so quickly
that the investor wishes to withdraw funds in mid-life to add to present consumption. This
paper demonstrates that the possibility that IRAs engender unplanned oversaving provides
a rationale for their introduction on welfare grounds. The paper specifically examines the
welfare effects of the introduction of slightly tax-favored retirement savings in a model
that clearly specities how liquid and illiquid savings are different. [f illiquid retirement
savings are slightly tax-preferred, then the saver is willing to take the risk early in life
that under some circumstances he will oversave later in life. Slight oversaving in mid-life,
enforced by the withdrawal restriction, has only a second order negative impact on
welfare as the saver is forced to deviate only slightly from his optimal second period
consumption. However, oversaving has a first order positive impact on expected tax
revenues.
A negative implication of IRAs is that they lower the tax on inframarginal savings,
defined as the contributions the saver is willing to make to an illiquid retirement account
even if it is not tax-favored. As a result the introduction of tax-favored retirement
accounts generally has to be accompanied by an increase in the tax rate on ordinary
savings for expected tax revenues to remain unchanged. This induced increase in the tax
on ordinary savings impacts welfare negatively. The implied negative effect on welfare is3
small, however, if inframarginal retirement savings are small. In the limiting case of zero
inframarginal savings, the secondary negative welfare effect disappears altogether. In this
limiting case, IRAs enable the tax authorities to increase expected tax revenues with a
negligible impact on the saver's welfare. In this instance retirement savings are clearly
welfare improving.
Uncertainty in the model takes the form of aggregate savings risk faced by a
representative saver, as this framework appears to be the simplest that can generate the
oversaving associated with the illiquidity of retirement savings that potentially improves
welfare. As further discussed in the concluding section, the possibility of oversaving
remains in a model with multiple savers that face personal, idiosycratic savings risk if in
fact the tax treatment of non-retirement savings and borrowings is asymmetric.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic
model. It first considers individual saving behavior for a given tax treatment of ordinary
and retirement savings. The section then analyzes the revenue and welfare implication of
the introduction of tax-favored retirement savings, and shows that the introduction of a
retirement savings channel can be welfare improving. Section 3 concludes.
2. The model
This section first outlines the basic structure of the model. It then considers the
agent's saving decisions given a certain tax treatment of retirement and ordinary savings.
It then shows how the introduction of tax-favored retirement savings accounts, which are
referred to as IRAs, can be welfare improving.
2.1 Outline of the model
The model of this paper is essentially as in Gale and Scholz [1990]. These authors,
however, are primarily interested in the agent's saving behavior given the ordinary and
retirement saving channels open to him. The focus here is instead on the government's
choice of saving channels that are made available to the saver. The latter problem is, of
course, more complex. To keep the analysis transparent, the model is therefore somewhata
simplified. Retirement savings, in particular, take the form of a savings account to which
the agent can contribute early in life, but not add to or withdraw from in mid-life.' A
real life counterpart could be a private pension plan associated with a worker's first job.
Of course, more elaborate retirement accounts, such as plans that impose yearly contribu-
tion ceilings and withdrawal penalties, potentially improve welfare at least as much as the
stylized retirement accounts discussed in this paper, as the stylized retirement accounts
examined here are simply a special case of more general retirement accounts.
The model consists of three periods. In period 1 the representative agent is
assumed to start out with an endowment of wealth W,. In the first period no consumption
takes place. In fact the agent's only first period decision is to allocate his wealth between
ordinary savings and retirement savings, denoted S, and S„ respectively. Both types of
savings receive a random gross return 0, and are not taxed.' The return 0, is assumed to
be a discrete random variable with mean 'B and variance ~o,. The i'th possible outcome
0,; (i 5 n) occurs with probability a,,. Let B„ be the smallest and A~, the largest possible
value of 8,,.
In the second period, the gross return to tirst period ordinary savings, S,A„ is
divided between second period consumption, C,, and second period ordinary savings, S2,
so that CZ f S2 - 5,0,. The gross second period return to retirement savings, S,ZA,,
however, is not available for second period consumption, as early withdrawals from the
retirement account are not feasible. The gross rate of return to all second period savings
is denoted AZ. Again the return 0, is a discrete random variable with mean g~ and
variance ~e~. The i'th possible outcome 0,, occurs with probability a2;. The two period
returns 0, and 0z are independent.
The government is assumed to have a certain expected tax revenue need in the
third period. To meet this need, the gross return to second period ordinary savings, SZOz,
is taxed at the rate ro, while the gross return to second period retirement savings,
S,ZA,02, is taxed at a rate r,.3 Third period consumption, C,, equals the net-of-tax return
to all second period savings.
The agent's saving decisions are summarized in Figure I. The first decision is the5
first period division of wealth W, into ordinary and retirement savings S, and 512. In the
second period, the gross return to ordinary tirst period savings 5,0, is then divided
between second period consumption C, and second period ordinary savings S~. Finally, in
period 3 the after-tax proceeds of all previous savings are consumed. The figure demon-
strates that first period retirement savings are less liquid than first period ordinary savings
as their return cannot be allocated to second period consumption.
The agent's preferences are characterized by the following utility index
V - ECj - REC} - abVar(C3) (1)
where E denotes expec[ation, IS is a discount tactor, b is a risk aversion parameter and
Var(C,) is the variance of third period consumption. Specification (1) implies that the
agent is risk neutral earlier in life, but risk averse in retirement.'
2.2 The individual saving decisions
This subsection considers the individual's saving choices for a given tax treatment
of ordinary and retirement savings. The agent's saving and consumption problem is
solved backwards We tirst examine the detennination of second period consumption, CZ,
and ordinary savings, S,, given previously chosen values of first period ordinary savings,
S„ and retirement savings, S,,, and given a panicular realization of the random first
period return 6,. Subsequently we consider the tirst period allocation of wealth W,
between S, and S,,.
Noting that C, t S, - S,A, we see that expected third period consumption, EC,,
and its variance, Var(C,), given b, are as follows
ECj - (S,B, - CZ)B~(I - ru) ' S,jB,Bi(1 - r,) (2)
Var(C3) - I(S,B, - Cz)(1 - r~ ' S,~B,(1 - r,))'QB2 (3)
From ( 1)-(3) it is then straightforward to solve that the agen['s optimal second
period consumption, C,, depends on the random first period return B, as follows6
CZ - -y T SiBi ~ S,ZBi
I- r`




if B, ? B,'
y- 1 ~aé2(1 - r,~ - 1) ~ o
2~iboez (1 - r~'
e; -
2abaó,(1 - r~(1 - r~)S,Z
[l~ez ( ( - r,~ - l]
(4)
(4')
In the above expressions (ig2(I - ro) - 1 is assumed to be positive. We will only
consider cases where the consumer in fact wishes to have positive second period con-
sumption, C2. A sufficient condition for this to be the case for ra ? r, from (4) is that
W,A„ ~ y. This assumption rules out the case where the agent is willing to put his
entire first period wealth into his retirement account.
Second period ordinary savings S, depend on the realization of the first period
savings return and on first period retirement savings S„ as follows
1 - r





In (4) and (5) 6,' is the lowest value of the random tirst period return 6, for
which optimally Sz - 0. With ra - r„ 6,' also is the lowest value of the first period
return 6, for which the withdrawal restriction on retirement savings is binding. With 6,
? 6,', the agent just optimally consumes the return to first period ordinary savings in the
second period or he wishes to consume more. In either case, there are no second period
ordinary savings, or S2 - 0. Put differently, with 6, ? A,' the illiquid gross returns to~
first period retirement savings are sufficient or exceed what is optimally saved for
retirement consumption in period 3.
Next we have to consider the first period choice between ordinary savings S, and
retirement savings S,Z. For the possibility of retirement savings to be meaningful, the tax
rate on retirement savings r, cannot exceed the tax rate on ordinary savings ro. With r,
- ro the saver may be indifferent between choosing some or no retirement savings. Of
course, in this case the saver will never choose retirement savings so high that the second
period withdrawal restriction can ever be strictly binding. For general values of r, 5 ro,
let S„' be the highest value of first period retirement savings S1z such that the second
period non-negativity constraint on ordinary savings, i.e. Sj ? 0, is never strictly
binding. From (5) we see that for any outcome of the random return A„ we have SZ ? 0
if retirement savings S„ do no exceed the critical value S„' given by
y(1 - r~
S~r - B~,(1 - r,)
(6)
For r, - r„ the agent is indifferent between values of S,2 that do not exceed the
upper bound S,t'. With r, ~ ro the agent below is shown to choose retirement savings S1z
above the threshold ]evel S,Z' so that it is possible the withdrawal restriction on retirement
savings is strictly binding in the second period.'
When considering the introduction of tax-favored retirement savings, the point of
departure will be an equal tax treatment of retirement and ordinary savings, or ro - r,. In
that instance, the expression for retirement savings S,,' in (6) represents the inframarginal
savings that benetit from a reduction on the tax on retirement savings.
The second period consumption and ordinary savings in (~3) through (5') indicate
how CZ and S, depend on the first period saving choices S, and S,:. We can now derive
an expression for the agent's expected utility index, V, as a function only of S,Z and the
tax rates ro and r, (and model parameters) as follows
V - ~ ~Wiei~ ' Siaei~( ~1 - r ~)
' 1'(QèZ(1 - r~ - 1) -
, ~abry'-(1 - r~' -oé:]~i~ '[Wiem t S1z(,(3B1(1 - r~) - 1)B,~ -
ab(S~z)~(B~,)'(I - r~)2a~;~]~~, (~)
Expression (7) retlects that with 6, G 6,,, equations (4) and (5) apply, while with
6, - 6,~ (4') and (5') apply."
The optimality condition with respect to first period retirement savings S,Z is as
follows
dV -~ ro-r
dS -~ Bi'(I -r )~''Y ii .~ o
[(Q9Z (1 - r,) - I )B~ - 2QbS„(B~)'(1 - r~)'aáiJ~r~, (8)
Using (6) and (8), we can check that dVIdS,~ - 0 at S,Z - S,Z' for r, - ro.
Hence, a small increase in retirement savings starting from S„' has no first order welfare
effect, eventhough as a result the retirement savings withdrawal restriction will be strictly
binding in the second period with probability ~r,,,. Starting from S„ - S11', however, an
increase in S,, has a second order negative impact on welfare given by
d-V -- 2Qb(B~)'(1 - r~)'-oó~a~ C 0
dS12
(9)
The negative second derivative d'V~dS„' is proportional to the probability a,o that
the withdrawal restriction will in fact be strictly binding.
To conclude this subsection, we wish to see how [he introduction of a small tax
bias towards retirement savings, starting from r, - r,,, affects ordinary and retirement
saving.9 First period retirement savings respond positively to the ordinary tax rate r„
but in a generally ambiguous way to the retirement saving tax rate r, as follows'o
dS
~ B,,a~~(1 - r~
~z „~
2~3b (B~,)'-( l - r,)Za' 'B,a~,
~ 0 (10)9
~ Bi~~i~(1 - r~ - [~392 - ab4Si,Qéz6m(1 - r,)~em~m
~z ~.i
1 (11)
dr, - 2(3b(B~)z( l - r,)ZO~Za~ C 0
dS
In the present model, the representative agent can not have negative second period
ordinary savings S,, as there is nobody for the representative agent to borrow from." To
develop the argument regarding the desirability of retirement accounts, it will be useful,
however, to consider how tax changes affect second period ordinary savings if there is no
non-negativity constraint on second period ordinary savings." In this instance, equations
(4) and (5) apply for all outcomes of the random return 0,. Now allowing for possibly
negative savings S,, we can use (5) and the derivatives in (10) and (11) to find that small
changes in the tax rates ro and r, (starting from ro - r,) affect Sz as follows
dSz dti - B dS'z - B S 1 1
dra - dr~ ~ drp ' iz 1- r~ ~ v
as
d.y - QB, ( I - r„) - 2
~
dru 2~ba2, ( 1 - r~~)} C 0
and
dSz
- B dS1z - B S 1 ~ 0
ár~ - ' ár~ ~ 1z I- ro
(12)
(13)
Second period ordinary savings are shown to increase or decrease with the tax rate
ra, while they unambiguously increase with the tax rate r,."
2.3 The introduction of IRAs
This section considers the welfare implications of the introduction of IRAs. The
discussion so far has made clear that the existence of a retirement saving channel is10
immaterial if retirement and ordinary savings receive the same tax treatment, as in that
case (illiquid) retirement savings will be zero or so slight that the retirement account
withdrawal restriction is never strictly binding. The effective introduction of a retirement
savings channel, then, amounts to setting the tax rate r, lower than ro. This subsection
shows that introducing differentially tax-favored retirement savings may improve private
welfare for given expected tax revenues accruing to the government. The result is for the
introduction of slightly tax-preterred retirement savings, and hence does not tell us to
what extent retírement savings should in fact be optimally tax-favored.
The objective of tax policy is to maximize the agent's expected welfare, subject to
a certain third period expected tax revenue constraint. Expected third period tax revenues,
denoted R, are the sum of expected tax revenues from the taxation of retirement and
ordinary taxation as follows
R - r~B,BzS,i ~ r~9zES1 (14)
Now consider the following tax experiment. Starting from a unified tax treatment
of all savings (i.e. r, - ro), we increase ro and decrease r, in such a way that expected
tax revenues, R, are unaltered for the case where counterfactually the non-negativity
constraint on S, can be ignored". A negative S, implies correspondingly negative third
period tax revenues stemming from the taxation of ordinary savings. With r, slightly
below ro, the saver selects retirement savings S1z sli~htly above S12' in (6)." In the event
of A, - 8,~ Si now is slightly negative according to (5).
To see how r, and ro are to be changed in order to maintain expected tax revenues
R, we can now totally differentiate (14) and solve for the proportional changes of ro and
r, as follows
dr~ dR~dr
dr~ - - dRldr~
(is)
where11
dR - r B,(dES Idr,) - r,B B,(dS ,Idr - B B S
ár o. z i i. ~) i z iz
1
and
i~~~iz 1 - ru
~o (16)
dR - r B ES Idr~ - r B B S Idr~ - B ES
dro u z( z ~ i z( iz z z
- Bz[y ' ro~y ] - BiBzSiz 1 C 0 dr~ 1 - r~
(17)
To derive the second lines of equations ( l6) and (17) use is made of (12) and (13).
Equations (16) and (l7), together with the expressions for y and S1z from (4) and (5),
allow us to express dr~ldr, in terms of the basic model parameters and the initial uniform
tax rate ro as follows
dr~ 6~IBu,
dr - - 1 Y rul[1 - QB,(1 - ru)] - BiiBu~
(18)
While generally dr,ldr, in (18) can be of either sign, below we will only consider
the case where dr~dr, ~ 0, i.e. where the introduction of IRAs requires lowering r, and
increasing ro if expected tax revenues are to remain constant (again absent the non-
negativity constraint on S,).16
The stylized introduction of retirement savings considered here involves a change
in the two tax rates r, and ro according to (]8). Combining (12) and (l3) we see that if
we ignore the non-negativity constraint on S, in the event of A, - 6~~ second period
ordinary savings S, will be affected as follows
dSz -[dy - B dS12 - B~'S'' ]dr -
dTU ~ dTU 1- rU U12
[- B dS1z { B"S'z
]dr, c 0
" dro I - r~
(19)
As we have S1z ~ S1z' for 6,- 6,~ and r, ~ r,,, it follows from (5) and (6) that
in this case SZ ~ 0 if in fact the non-negativity constraint on S1 can be ignored. However,
negative ordinary savings are not possible in the present model and hence with A,- A,o
the agent is forced to oversave."
This oversaving has a tirst order positive effect on tax revenues, and only a second
order negative impact on welfare. In particular, the increase in expected tax revenues
generated by the oversaving, dR,is given by
dR - - ro~za"dSz ~ 0 (20)
where dS2 is as in (19).
Equation (20) establishes that the introduction of slightly tax-preferred retirement
savings raises expected tax revenues. Slight oversaving per se, given the introduction of
tax-preferred retirement savings, only has a second order negative impact on expected
welfare. What remains to be examined, however, are the welfare consequences of the
initial introduction of a system of tax-preferred retirement savings according to (15). For
this purpose, we will again ignore the non-negativity constraint on S2, as this constraint
by itself negligibly affects welfare for given small perturbations in the tax rates ro and r,.
This implies we can asswne the agent is not constrained in his second period consumption
and savings choice so that (4) and (5) apply.
Making use of (2)-(5) to substitute for C, and Var(C~) into (1), we can now
express the agent's expected welfare as a function of only the tax on ordinary savings r,
and model parameters as follows
V- ECz - YQe,(1 - r~ - l3by' -( I - r~)'QÓz (21)
In (21) ECZ also is implicitly a function of the tax rate ro. !n particular, noting (5)
and the equalities Ci t SZ - S,6, and S, t S12 - W„ we now can easily derive that
dEC2 --d(y(1 - r~)).'~ Of course, the tax rate changes according to (15) affect the13
expression y(I - ro) as well as the last two terms in (2l) that compactly represent the
certainty equivalent of expected third period welfare.
As V in (21) now only depends on the initial tax rate on ordinary savings, we see
that the introduction of tax-preferred retirement savings affects expected welfare V as
follows
dV - ro , d(1'(1 - r~) ~ 0








Not suprisingly (22) indicates that the introduction of a system of differential
taxation of retirement savings with a higher ro affects welfare negatively.
Now we are in a position to assess the overall welfare implication of the introduc-
tion of IRAs. Let us assume that
dy 1
Bz[Y ` ro-] - B b,S
dr~ ' 1z 1 - r~
From (17) we see that condition (23) implies that an increase in the tax rate ra on
ordinary savings from a situation where all savings are taxed at a rate ro augments
expected tax revenues. Condition (23) further implies that a uniform tax increase on all
savings, i.e. dro - dr, ~ 0, augments expected tax revenues R, as from (16) and (17) we
have dRldr~ f dRldr, -"g [y t r„(dyldr,)], which is positive from (23). Finally, (23)
implies that dr~dr, c 0 so indeed we are indeed considering the case where retirement
savings are made slightly tax-preferred.
Equation (22) tell us that in order to assess the welfare affects of the introducion
of tax-preferred savings, we have to focus on the required changed in the tax rate on
ordinary savings r,,. With (23) holding we can see from (16) and (17) that the absoluteta
value of dr~dr, is positively related to S,,. In other words if S1z, which is the inframar-
ginal savings benehting from a reduction in the tax rate r„ is small, then the increase in
the tax rate ro necessary to compensate for the reduction in r, so as to keep R constant
will be small as well (if we again ignore the impact of the non-negativity constraint on Sz
for tax revenues as in (20)). In the limiting case of S„ equal to zero, ra is not adjusted at
all following a small reduction in r,. In this limiting case, the agent's welfare is negligibly
affected by the introduction of tax-preferred retirement savings according to (22). In this
instance, however, the positive impact of the introduction of retirement savings as in (22)
can still be non-negligible. Note from (6) that inframarginal savings S,Z' tend to zero as
B" goes to infinity.
The following proposition formalizes the assertion that the introduction of tax-
preferred retirement savings can positively affect tax revenues with a negligible impact on
welfare for the limiting case where inframarginal savings are zero:
Proposition 1: For the limiting case of 9,~ ti oo, ;dRIdV; y oo for a slight reduction in
r, below r,,.
Proof: For the case of 6,,, -~ oo, tirst note that dr~~dr, -~ 0 in (18), i.e. in the limit r~ can
be reduced without a corresponding increase in r~ to keep R tixed (if we ignore the non-
negativity constraint on SZ). Now from (22) dVldr, -~ 0. In (19) we have
B dS" -~ 0
" dr~
e~~ 1 S''r~
dS,j 2l( l- r~ - a02
-6,o dr ~ 2ab(1 - r;) oóa15
and
-6 dSiz r ei"Siz
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In the limiting case of Proposition l, the introduction of retirement savings
accounts allows the government to increase expected tax revenues with only a negligible
impact on welfare, or alternatively to increase welfare with only a negligible impact on
expected third period tax revenues. Of course, this can not be achieved if the only tax
instrument available is a single tax rate all savings in the absence of a retirement savings
channel.
3. Conclusion
Previous studies of tax-favored retirement savings have primarily been concerned
with the individual's saving decisions given the saving channels available to him. A main
academic concern has been whether retirement accounts such as IRAs increase overall
saving. While it is important to know how individuals respond to IRAs, this information
by itself dces not allow one [o assess whether IRA-like retirement accounts are in fact16
welfare improving. The purpose of this paper has been to show that the introduction of
retirement savings accounts can improve weltare.
Basically the illiquidity of retirement savings makes it possible that individuals
save more in mid-life than they wish to. Srnall oversaving by itself, enforced by the
withdrawal restriction, has a positive impact on expected tax revenues, and only a
negligible second order impact on welfare. In a limiting case where the inframarginal
savings benefiting from a reduction in the tax on retirement savings are negligible,
differentially tax-favored retirement savings accounts allow the tax authorities to increase
expected tax revenues while keeping individual weltare constant. In the case of non-
negligible inframarginal retirement savings, the introduction of retirement savings
generally may or may not be welfaré improving. The paper only examines the introducti-
on of slightly tax-favored retirement accounts, and hence dces not address [o what extent
retirement savings should optimally be tax-favored.
In the paper oversaving is unavoidable in some states of nature as there is non-
diversifiable aggregate savings risk. If instead there are only idiosyncratic savings risks
and perfect insurance markets, then aggregate oversaving cannot occur if in addition the
tax treatment of saving and borrowing is symmetric. In practice, of course, insurance
markets are not perfect which is an independent reason oversaving can occur. Further, the
tax treatment of interest income and expense, at least in the United States, is not
symmetric. This is the case as interest on pure consumption loans is not deductible from
taxable income at present. Also, provisions for carrying forward the (negative) tax on
negative income are imperfect, as the carrying forward of negative income reduces the
present value of its tax benefit. Interestingly, the present paper provides an indirect
rationale for an asymmetric tax treaunent of interest income and expense, as it may be a
factor in the occurrence of overall beneticial oversaving.
Oversaving, with a binding withdrawal restriction, differs from forced saving
where individuals are simply forced to set aside a certain fraction of their ineome as
savings. Contributions to retirement accounts in this paper have been assumed to be
completely voluntary. Forced contributions to savings accounts may be rationalized if the
government cannot commit to not provide public assistance to indigent retirees or if17
savers themselves are strongly myopic. Of course, forced initial contributions aze
meaningless if there are no subsequent withdrawal restrictions as apply to IRAs.19
Finally there appears to be an interesting analogy between IRAs and the non-
repatriation requirements imposed by some developing countries on outgoing dividend
payments. Repatriation restrictions applied to investment income are similar to binding
savings withdrawal restrictions associated with IRAs. The analysis of the paper suggests
that countries may optimally offer tax-favored, long term investment channels along with
ordinary shon term investment channels to prospective foreign direct investors.18
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Fi,~ure l. Saving choices
Sz -~SiBz(I - r„)
~ S,ZB, ' S,jB,B2(1 - r,)zo
Endnotes
1. The tax deductibility of IRA contributions is phased out at income levels above
540,000 for couples, and at income levels above 525,000 for singles.
2. The Canadian plan, however, differs substantially from IRAs as there are no
withdrawal penalties.
3. The early life savings decision referred to in the text may in fact occur in mid-life
for large groups of savers. The model in Gale and Scholz [1990] allows for second
period contributions to the retirement account up to a limit L~. They also incorpo-
rate positive, but finite withdrawal penalities. Implicitly in the present paper early
withdrawal penalties are set to infinity, as such withdrawls are not allowed at all.
However, the welfare implications of a differential introduction of tax-favored
retirement savings in section 2.3 are not affected by the presence of positive, but
small withdrawal penalties.
4. The argument of section 2.3 remains qualitatively unaffected if instead all first
period savings are simply taxed at a uniform rate before as well as after illiquid
retirement accounts are introduced. Such a first period savings tax of course
yields the government certain expected tax revenues in the second period when the
tax is collected. From the saver's perspective, a uniform first period savings tax
only reduces the random return variable 6,. Hence, with a first period savings
tax, the 6, variable as used in section 2.3 should be reinterpreted as the net-of-
tax return on tirst period savings.
5. Alternatively, net income could be taxed. Of course, there is a simple (return-
dependent) relationship between taxes on gross and net income. The model dces
not allow for tax deductions for contributions to the retirement account in the first
period, as are available for IRA contributions. However, the two tax rates ro
and r, can be interpreted as effective tax rates on ordinary and retirement savings
taking into account the values of the initial tax benetits of the two forms of
savings, if any.
6. Gale and Scholz [1990] assume tirst period consumption is possible, and that the
agent is risk-averse with respect to his second period consumption. To get from
the model in Gale and Scholz [1990] to the present framework, one has to set the
second period risk parameter to zero and one has to assume that B~ so that first
period conswnption is optimally set to zero given the utility index as in (1).
Second-period risk-neutrality is only assumed for reasons of tractability and should
not affect the main result of the paper.
7. The last two paragraphs mention the (i) non-negativity constraint on ordinary
second period savings S,, and (ii) the withdrawal restriction applicable to retire-
ment savings in the second period. For the case of r~ - r„ these two restrictions
are equivalent in the sense that either both or none are binding. For the general
case of r, ~ ro, however, they are not equivalent. In particular, the saver may21
be willing to borrow at present against future retirement income (at least if
borrowings and savings have a symmetric tax treatment) so that optimally Sz e
0, even if the saver is not willing to take funds out of his tax-favored retirement
account.
8. Equation (7) reflects that in this paper we only consider cases where retirement
savings are made differentially tax-favored so that the IRA withdrawal is not
binding for 6, C 6,~, while it is binding for 6, - 6,,, (strictly or not strictly).
More generally for larger differences between r~ and r„ the withdrawal restricti-
on can be binding even if A, c 6,~ as retlected in equations (4) through (5').
9. First note that from (8) we can derive
Z -~
da S'Z -~ Bi~~i~ 1 1 r~ ~ 0
dZV - ~ 1 -
drodSiZ ~[.-i. - Br~~, 1 - ro
[~3Bz - Qb4S1zBNaóz(I - r~))Bma~~ C 0
A substitution for S„ - S1z' from (6) and then for y from (4) is necessary to sign
the above derivative.
10. These derivatives apply for an increase in r~ or a reduction in r„ starting from
ra - r, and S,Z - S,,'. If instead r~ is slightly reduced or r, slightly increa-
sed, then S,Z drops to zero.
11. In a representative agent setting with only aggregate savings risk all agents (if
there are in fact many) are indeed alike at all staoes and private borrowíng cannot
occur. Of course, if the model were to include idiosyncratic savings risks as well
as aggregate risk, then there could be second period borrowing by some individu-
als against third period income from their retirement savings. Also in an internati-
onal setting the agent could borrow from abroad.
12. For this purpose we assume the third period tax treatment of second period
positive and negative ordinary savings is symmetric.




dra - 2Qbvó,( l -r~)' -.,
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Of course, with B, - B,~ we have dSz~dr„ c 0.
14. This is possible if (23) below holds.
I5. To see this, note from (5) and (6) that with B,- B~,
Sz - y IS~: - S,z]
S,i
Hence, starting from r„ - r, and S„' - S12 we ha~e
dS, dS, dS,; dS~, dS,: dS„
sign [ dr~ - dr ]-
sign ( dr~ dr~ ~ dr~ - dr ]
with dr„~dr~ as in (18).
As from footnote (13) we see dS, 1 0 with dr, ~ 0 and dro ~ 0 for B, -
B~„ it follows that in this case d(S,,' - S,,] ~ 0.
16. Other possible cases of changing r„ and r, are (i) dr, 1 0, dr, - 0, (ii) dra 1
dr, ~ 0, and (iii) dr, ~ dr~ ~ 0. ln these cases the introduction of IRAs
generally can offer a more favorable trade off between expected tax revenues and
expected utility than changes in a uniform tax on all savings as well as in the case
of dra ~ 0, dr, ~ 0 examined below. These other cases, however, are not
further pursued.
17. See footnote (15) for a proof of the first assertion.
18. To see this, note from (4) that23
Cz(1 - ru) --y(1 - ro) f Siei(1 - ru) f Sizei(1 - r~)
--y(1 - ru) f W,B, - ru(Cz -~ Sz) - r,Sa9,
Hence,
Cz --ry(1 - ru) f W,B, -(rusz f r~Si,B~)
and
d(ECz) - -d(y(I - ro))
as dR - 0.
19. Even if governments can commit, however, withdrawal restriction associated with
previous savings could have a role if individual preferences are time inconsistent.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg Unlverstty, Tbe Netherlands:
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